CC v UU [2025] EWFC 214: Reported: 15 July 2025.
Peel J dismissed the wife’s applications for a legal services payment order (“LSPO”) in respect of appeal proceedings to the Court of Appeal and in her set aside application on grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction to make such orders.
CC v UU [2025] EWFC 214: The background
Peel J dismissed the wife’s applications for a legal services payment order (“LSPO”)
The parties were married in 1999. There was a dispute about the length of pre-marriage cohabitation and date of separation. The husband argued this was 6 years, while the wife states this was 18 years. The divorce petition was issued in November 2015, and the Decree Absolute pronounced on 8 December 2023.
At the final hearing in financial remedy proceedings, the wife applied for an adjournment which was refused. The wife left the court building and did not attend the hearing and the Judge proceeded in her absence. On 11 December 2023, DJ Barry made a final financial remedies order providing for sale of the FMH, equal division of the proceeds and a clean break. There was no order in respect of the husband’s pension. An order for costs was made against the wife.
The wife appealed against the refusal of DJ Barry to adjourn the hearing. This was refused on 5 June 2024.
The wife also applied to set aside the order, and this was refused on 11 April 2024. Permission to appeal this order was refused on 18 June 2024.
On 24 April 2025, HHJ Parry refused a without notice application by the wife for a freezing order. The wife sought permission to appeal the order. On 16 May 2025, Hayden J made, on a without notice basis, an interim freezing order pending determination of this appeal.
On 19 May 2025, Williams J discharged the interim freezing order. The wife sought permission from the Court of Appeal to appeal this order. The wife made an LSPO application on 5 June 2025 to pursue this appeal.
On 26 June 2025, the wife filed a second application seeking to set aside the 11 December 2023 financial remedies order. The wife sought a LSPO in the sum of £50,000 to pursue this application.
During the hearing before Peel J, the court was invited to adjourn the LSPO application in respect of the application for permission to appeal the order of Williams J discharging the freezing order.
CC v UU [2025] EWFC 214: The law
There are two ways in which a party may apply for a LSPO. These are as follows:
1. Pursuant to s22ZA Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012) which provides that:
a. In proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation, the court may make an order or orders requiring one party to the marriage to pay to the
other (“the applicant”) an amount for the purpose of enabling the applicant to obtain legal services for the purposes of the proceedings.
b. The court may also make such an order or orders in proceedings under this Part for financial relief in connection with proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation.
c. There are corresponding provisions under s38A Schedule 5 Civil Partnership Act 2004.
2. Pursuant to common law (ie. where the statutory route is not available because the parties were not married or in a civil partnership):
a. Applications for a LSPO under Schedule 1 Children Act 1989, Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, and/or Part III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.
Analysis
Peel J noted that a party to divorce proceedings may apply for a LSPO under s22ZA unless prohibited from doing so by the imposition of a clean break. A party cannot invoke s22ZA for an ancillary purpose such as the pursuit of an appeal, enforcement or set aside application.
Whether all claims have been dismissed depends on the construction of the order. Peel J stated that if the clean break takes effect upon implementation of the order, then a s22ZA claim can be made up and until the point of implementation. Peel J further considered that the power to make a s22ZA order is retained where an appeal is launched and the original order is stayed pending appeal.
The court was referred to Ahmad and & v Faraj [2025] EWCA Civ 468 where a final financial remedies order was made and permission to appeal granted. A LSPO order was made in favour of the wife to enable her to be represented in the appeal. The husband appealed this order on grounds that there was no jurisdiction to make such an order. Permission to appeal on this ground was refused as the financial remedies order provided for spousal periodical payments and, therefore, the wife’s claims had not been dismissed.
In Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2023] EWFC 158 jurisdiction was similarly established as there was a periodical payments order in place and a clean break had not taken place.
What can we learn from CC v UU [2025] EWFC 214?
The applications for an LSPO were dismissed.
Court of Appeal Proceedings
There was no power to make an application under s22ZA in the Court of Appeal proceedings. In this case a final order had been made, and the clean break took effect on 8 December 2023. Thereafter, the wife was not entitled to make a s22ZA application. Furthermore, the appeal arose out of a free-standing application for a freezing injunction and not the financial remedy proceedings themselves.
Set Aside Application
Peel J found that a set aside application does not fall within the definition of an order “in proceedings under this Part for financial relied” as it is not made under Part II Matrimonial
Causes Act. Peel J was not persuaded that because the set aside application relates to a concluded financial relief application, it becomes part of those financial relief proceedings (in this case 19 months later).
Peel J determined there was, therefore, no jurisdiction for the court to make a LSPO under s22ZA either in the Court of Appeal proceedings or the proposed set aside application.
Additional Observations
Peel J made additional observations in relation to the wife’s applications.
The first was in respect of the second set aside application dated 26 June 2025. Peel J noted that the court may have the power to strike out this application as an abuse of process under FPR 2010 4.4(1)(b) as, unless able to produce compelling new material that had not been previously advanced, a party should not be permitted to run the same case multiple times over.
Peel J additionally rejected the wife’s request for her set aside application to be heard at the Central Family Court noting that these applications must be heard in the court that made the original order (FPR 2010 PD 9A 13.3). The full judgment can be found here.
This blog was written by Sofia Santos, who practices in all areas of family law. Please get in touch if you have any additional questions and we will be pleased to help you.